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• Comments on the first phase since mid-March
• Compensation of damages caused by Covid-19
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Comments on the first phase (1)
● Impact of no aid measures or de minimis aid
● general measures
● support to citizens
● wage subsidies
● suspension or deferral of corporate taxs & VAT (w/o sector differentiation)
● de minimis aid
● Quick reaction targeting liquity needs
o Legal clarification (similar to October 2008 communication)
o Procedure (notification templates, waiver on language, speed, dedicated means & webpage)
● TF too general and not targeted enough?
○ Moral hazard? Zombies firms? Cleansing effect? Sufficient safeguards?
○ How loans and loan guarantees can make good a lockdown effect for several months? 
 No rescue and restructuring cases?
Some comments on the first phase (2)
● Unbalanced reaction by Member States: (92 decisions as at 29.4.2020 - 9:15 am)
Article 107(2) b) Article 107(3) b) Article 107(3) c) under TF
8 decisions 77 decisions under TF – 3 107(3 b) 4 decisions (Covid-19 products)
No discretion by Commission Discretion by Commission
Past Future
Detailed financial data required Limited to no financial data required
Can be cumulated 
Cash needed in principle Less cash needed Cash needed
Some comments on the first phase (3)
● Aid tailored by sector?
o TF not sector by sector but 107(2)(b) notification template focuses on sectors (aviation)
o Mostly: (air) transport, automotive, agriculture, energy, digital sector, health, event companies 
o Commissioner Vestager on 107(2)(b) measures: “the most obvious way to go”
o Global competition and recovery plans
o State aid as a unique control system in the world
o Many FTAs include “State aid” provisions but weak enforcement
o Need for reciprocity
o EU distortion - disparity
o Big pocket Member States
o EU-wide recovery fund for certain sectors?
o Recovery plans and Green Deal and Digital Agenda?
o Litigation?
Article 107(2) b) – “to make good damages 
caused by exceptional occurrences”
● “Natural disaster”
o storms, earthquake, floods, eruptions
● “Exceptional occurrences”
o war, strikes, major industrial accidents, terrorism (9/11 – 11/15 & 3/16)
● Aid compatible in law
○ No discretion for the Commission 
 T-268/06 Olympiaki Aeroporia Ypiresies AE v Commission, para 51
○ But aid still to be notified and approved
 Covid-19 notification template published by DG COMP
○ Objective conditions to be construed restrictively
Article 107(2) b) – conditions
● Exceptional occurrence
o The Covid-19 outbreak constitutes such an exceptional occurrence
 TF, § 8, 15
 8 decisions (DK (4), FR (1), SW (2), GE (1))
○ Sectors (not limited to):
 transport, tourism, culture, hospitality, retail, organisers of cancelled events
○ Damage caused by the exceptional occurrence 
○ Direct causal link
○ Damage assessed as precisely as possible
 C-346/03 and C-529/03 Atzeni a.o. v Commission, para. 79
 T-268/06 Olympiaki Aeroporia Ypiresies v Commission, para. 52
● Reference period?
○ When companies “could not operate normally”
○ Income recorded during the reference period v. income recorded prior to the event
○ This can include costs which occurred beyond the days of the event (progressive exit)
 catching-up phase following the reopening of the business 
 additional costs linked to the restart of the operations
 decision 1.8.2011 SA.32163 - 2010/N - Slovenia – Icelandic volcano ash in April 2010
Article 107(2) b) – No overcompensation
● Counterfactual value-added (average value-added of the previous year): what 
the company would have accrued if the event would not have happened
○ foregone revenues due to the closure + additional costs directly attributable to the closure
○ minus operational costs avoided during the closure
○ actual damage: the difference in turnover and costs between what actually occurred and what should 
have happened (the counterfactual scenario)
● Indicators 
○ revenue and cost items likely to be affected by the event
○ cost items unlikely to be affected under the counterfactual scenario compared to the actual one (not 
considered for compensation)
● Safeguards
○ verification of aid applications at several levels by specially appointed bodies
○ documentary evidence
○ prosecution for false or incorrect declarations and recovery with interests.
Article 107(2) b) and Temporary Framework
● No aid granted to an undertaking in difficulty at the time of the event
○ Difficulty:
○ Economic death certain w/o State intervention
○ Loss of +50% of capital or be subject to collective insolvency proceedings
○ Large undertakings (past two years)
 debt to equity ratio > 7.5 
 EBITDA interest coverage ratio < 1.0
● “One time last time” principle does not apply (107(2) not an ‘R&R’ aid)
○ Member States may compensate damages directly caused by Covid-19 to undertakings that 
have received aid under the R&R Guidelines.
○ However, they should no longer be ‘in difficulty’: i.e. having completed the restructuring plan
● No circumvention of rescue and restructuring aid principles
○ Not used to remedy undertakings' problems unrelated to the relevant events.
● Non-discriminatory 
Article 107(2)(b) decisions (as at 29 April 2020)
Only four Member States: DK, FR, SW, GE
- Cancellation of events and schemes
- Airlines
Only three individual measures: 
- DK and SW – SAS
• DK+SW: partial compensation (2 X €137 m guarantees on revolving credit facility) for the 
cancellation or re-scheduling of flights
• DK: exact damage quantified after the crisis (2020 operating accounts); quantification 
method subject to Commission's prior approval; claw-back mechanism 
• SW: complementary to another State guarantee scheme for airlines (difficulties in 
obtaining loans); alternative to the guarantee scheme; claw-back mechanism
- GE - Condor (rescued Thomas Cook German subsidiary)
• flights cancellations, loan guarantee (€550 m), no cash, claw-back mechanism
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Next steps? 
• Recapitalisation (Article 107(3) b TFEU)
• Rescue & Restructuring?
Jacques Derenne
Partner, Brussels & Paris bars
Professor, Liège University & Brussels School of Competition
Recapitalisation measures?
• Commission consulted Member States on 9 April 2020
• ongoing debate on the strict conditions for such structural measures
• Inspiration from the financial crisis?
o miscellaneous financial instruments, not limited to capital
o subordinated loans? [max 5% turnover; 40% annual wage bill?]
o repayment terms with incentives to exit the State at the earliest
• State remuneration increasing over time to reach the market price
o restrictions on the behaviour of beneficiaries
• commercial restraint, ban on acquisitions, dividends, bonuses, buyback programmes
o State remuneration in proportion to the size of the beneficiary company
o specific structural and behavioural remedies (divestitures) and exit strategy
• according to the size of the companies and their market position
• restructuring plan if State stays on beyond a certain date?
• exit depending on the State’s concerned situation?
Other types of measures? Rescue & restructuring aid?
● If in difficulty after 31.12.2019
● Rescue
 Temporary, reversible; minimum necessary (formula)
 Social hardship or market failure
 Loans or guarantees - max. 6 months, 1-year IBOR + 400 bps
● Restructuring
 Restructuring plan (LT viability)
 Aid limited to the minimum
 Burden sharing - Significant contribution of the beneficiary
 Avoidance of undue distortions of competition
 Counterfactuals / compensatory measures
● New Covid-19 adjusted R&R guidelines? 
 2014 guidelines very much shaped by 2009 fiancial crisis guidelines
 Shift from “bail out” towards “bail in” applicable for Covid-19?
